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Comments
FULL COURT PRESS: HOW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
WEAKENED THE NBA'S COMPETITIVE EDGE
IN A GLOBALIZED SPORT
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2005, the National Basketball Association
("NBA") confronted enormous pressure to reach a new labor con-
tract with its players' union.' After extensive negotiations between
NBA Commissioner David Stern and the players' union president,
Billy Hunter, the two sides achieved a new deal and barely avoided
a potentially costly lockout.2 The terms of the new collective bar-
gaining agreement ("CBA") imposed many new restrictions on play-
ers and team owners.3 Most notably, the CBA increased the NBA's
minimum draft entry age to nineteen years old and instituted an
1. See No Lockout - NBA Labor Deal Reached, NBCSPoRTS.COM, http://nbc-
sports.msnbc.com/id/8295646/site/21 683474/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) [herein-
after No Lockout - NBA Labor Deal Reached] (describing intense pressure to reach
new agreement before current contract expired). Failure to reach a new labor
contract would likely result in a lockout by the players and a league wide shut-
down. See id. (discussing possibility of lockout). Additionally, the owners were
aware that failed labor negotiations in the National Hockey League ("NHL") had
resulted in a player lockout and eventually cost the league its 2005 season. See
Thomas Heath, NHL, Union to Meet Again, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2005, at D1, availa-
ble at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36297-2005Feb18.html
(announcing cancellation of 2005 NHL season after collective bargaining negotia-
tions between players and owners stalled); Liz Robbins, N.B.A. Expects Smoother Path
to Labor Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at DI, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2005 /02/ 18/sports/basketball/ l8stern.html?_r=I &oref=slogin (detailing
how NBA owners wanted to avoid NHL style lockout by signing new agreement
with players). Therefore, representatives on both sides of the NBA faced enor-
mous pressure to remain flexible during negotiations and avoid a stalemate over
the specific conditions of employment. See No Lockout - NBA Labor Deal Reached,
supra (commenting on key terms that held up negotiations for months).
2. See No Lockout - NBA Labor Deal Reached, supra note 1 (recounting moments
leading up to 2005 collective bargaining agreement). The NBA announced the
agreement less than two weeks before the old CBA expired on June 30, 2005. See
id. (detailing timing of new CBA). The effects of a lockout would cost players
millions in unearned salaries, teams would lose hundreds of millions in lost reve-
nues and most importantly, the lockout would induce a lasting disdain from fans
who would spend less on league merchandise and tickets. See Steve Aschburner,
Lockout Revisited, 10 years Later, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, July 808/lockout.
revisited/index.html (analyzing major losses sustained after NBA lockout in 1998).
3. See NBA, CBA Principal Deal Points, http://www.nba.com/news/cba_
summary_050804.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (documenting new provisions in
NBA's 2005 CBA). The agreement remains legally binding until the end of the
(343)
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increased salary cap on the maximum expenditure permitted on a
team's roster.
4
NBA officials assumed that these restrictive terms would pro-
vide young players with an opportunity to mature at the collegiate
level before entering the professional arena and maintain a com-
petitive balance of talent throughout the NBA. 5 These assump-
tions, however, rested on the principal conviction that the NBA
held the title as the premiere global basketball league, which at-
tracted the most skilled domestic and foreign players. 6 Addition-
2010-2011 season and includes an option exercisable by the NBA to extend the
CBA one additional season. See id.
4. See id. (presenting 2005 CBA's age requirement and salary cap for teams).
The draft age requirement increased from eighteen to nineteen years old. See id.
Specifically, "U.S. players must be at least one year removed from high school and
19 years of age (by the end of that calendar year) before entering the draft. An
international player must turn 19 during the calendar year of the draft." Id. Addi-
tionally, under the new agreement, the salary cap increased from forty eight per-
cent of all of Basketball Related Income ("BRI") in the 2004-2005 season ($49.5
million) to forty nine and one half percent of BRI in 2005-2006 and then to fifty
one percent of BR] for the remainder of the contract. See id. In general, BRI
"includes all income received by teams as a result of basketball operations - ticket
sales, sponsorship, television revenue, and so on .... "CONTEMPORARY SPORT MAN-
AGEMENT 106-07 Uanet B. Parks et. al. eds., 3d ed. 2007). For the NBA's 2008-2009
season, fifty one percent of BRI amounted to $58.68 million. See NBA, NBA Salary
Cap for 2008-09 Season, http://www.nba.com/news/salarycapset_080709.html
(last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (calculating precise dollar amount of BRI).
5. See Brian Shaffer, Comment, The NBA's Age Requirement Shoot and Misses:
How The Non-Statutory Exemption Produces Inequitable Results for High School Basketball
Stars, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 681, 685-86 (2008) (stating league's argument in
favor of age limit); MarcJ. Yoskowitz, Note, A Confluence of Labor and Antitrust Law:
The Possibility of Union Decertification in the National Basketball Association to Avoid the
Bounds of Labor Law and Move Into the Realm of Antitrust, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
579, 631-33 (1998) (describing how salary cap encourages competition). But see
Steve Aschburner, Big Business: NBA, NCAA are Both Wrong in Debate About Age Limit,
SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, Apr. 7, 2008, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/
writers/steve aschburner/04/07/nba.age/index.html (describing how age limit
adversely impacts players). Opponents of the age limit argue that the "one and
done" requirement of playing in college forces talented high school players to
forgo a potential multi-million dollar contract, risk destroying their draft stock if
they sustain an injury during collegiate play and provides no tangible educational
benefits. See Shaffer, supra, at 686-87 (providing arguments against age limit); One-
and-done Takes New Meaning in ACC, FREEDOM NEWS SERVICE, http://www.gaston
gazette.com/sports/one_29164_article.html/carolina-north.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2009) (analogizing NBA's "one and done" phrase of players "going
through one college season and then leaving for the NBA" to conference sched-
ules in college basketball).
6. See Charles Euchner, Hoop Dreams: With Powerful Global Marketing, the NBA is
Pushing Basketball Past Soccer as the Most Popular Sport in the World, THE AMERICAN,
Jan.-Feb. 2008, available at http://www.american.com/archive/2008/january-
february-magazine-contents/hoop-dreams (commenting on NBA's ability to "at-
tract top international talent"); see also John Hollinger, The 30 Best International
Players in the NBA, ESPN.coM, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?
columnist=hollinger-john&page=All-World-30Best (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (list-
Vol. 16: p. 343
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ally, under the Commissioner Stern's guidance, the NBA perceived
expansion into overseas markets as an inevitable reality that faced
no genuine competitive threat. 7
For a few years after the signing, the NBA continued to collec-
tively maintain a monopoly on global talent. As a result of the
CBA's limiting conditions of employment, the labor deal readily
produced the desired results. 8 Nevertheless, during the 2008 free
agency period, the NBA's global dominance hit an abrupt road-
block when a top domestic high school recruit directly challenged
the principals behind the NBA's age requirement by signing
abroad, and an increasingly large number of NBA players entered
new contracts with foreign leagues. 9
This Comment analyzes why such an abrupt shift occurred by
comparing and contrasting the legal restrictions imposed on the
ing NBA's top international players). Notable international athletes currently play-
ing in the NBA include Dirk Nowitzki, Tim Duncan, Steve Nash and Yao Ming. See
Hollinger, supra (ranking top international players). In addition, in the 2006-2007
season "only two teams had an all-American roster." Hollinger, supra.
7. See Stern Lays Out Vision for NBA Expansion in Europe, ESPN.coM, http://
sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3315819 (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (re-
counting Commissioner Stern's belief NBA will expand into Europe within next
ten years).
8. See Michael Lee, The NBA in China: Opening a Super Market, WASH. POST,
Oct. 18, 2007, at El, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/10/17/AR2007101702218_pf.html (commenting on NBA's
monopoly of top global players and increased foreign market share); Can't Get
Enough of That NBA, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, http://washingtontimes.com/
news/2008/feb/18/cant-get-enough-of-that-nba/ (commenting on Commissioner
Stern's success in marketing NBA to global markets); Tom Van Riper, The NBA'S
Global Full Court Press, FORBES.COM, Nov. 13, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/
managing/2006/11/13/leadership-basketball-sports-lead-manage-cx -tvrT 11 l3nba.
html (describing how NBA is at forefront of basketball's globalization).
9. See Ian Whittell, Can Europe Afford the NBA's Biggest Stars?, ESPN.coM, http:/
/sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?page=NBA-Europe-080827 (last visited
Mar. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Can Europe Afford the NBA's Biggest Stars?] (detailing un-
usually large number of free agents in 2008 signing with foreign leagues and ex-
ploring possibility that NBA's leading superstars may follow). Notable former NBA
players who have signed abroad include: Gordan Giricek, Jannero Pargo, Carlos
Arroyo, Earl Boykins, Josh Childress, Nenad Krstic, Bostjan Nachbar, Carlos
Delfino, Primoz Brezec,Juan Carlos Navarro andJorge Garbajosa. See NBA, Player
Movement 2008: Free Agents By Name, Oct. 3, 2008, http://www.nba.com/trans
actions/movement2008_name.html (listing 2008 free agent signings). Addition-
ally, Brandon Jennings, an 18 year-old high school all-star, opted to sign an agree-
ment with a foreign league rather then attend an NCAA institution before
becoming draft eligible. See Mike Kahn, Europe Looking Very Attractive for NBA Free
Agents, FoxSPORTS.COM, http://msn.foxsports.com/nba/story/8370370/Europe-
looking-very-attractive-for-NBA-free-agents (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (discussing
Jennings move and free agent signings abroad).
20091
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NBA and professional basketball leagues abroad. 10 Section II pro-
vides a general overview of the structure of each league and the
interaction of the relevant domestic employment laws."I Section III
analyzes how the CBA's legally binding restrictions place the NBA
at an extreme disadvantage compared to foreign leagues and offers
possible actions that the NBA may take to counter this new threat. 12
Section IV concludes that the rise of credible international compe-
tition has rendered many of the current CBA's goals unachievable
and possibly forever changed the premier face of basketball.' 3
II. BACKGROUND
A. Collective Bargaining in the NBA
1. The Interaction between United States Antitrust and Labor Laws
Since its formation, the NBA has seen its fair share of litigation
within the United States. 14 Twenty-nine of the NBA's thirty teams
are located within the United States and subject to the country's
laws regulating union activities, employment contracts and collec-
tive bargaining.' 5
Union activities in the United States must comport with the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").16 The NLRA guarantees
the right of employees to unionize under a single organization for
the purpose of collectively negotiating their terms of employment
10. For a further discussion of the legal restrictions surrounding the creation
of the NBA and foreign leagues, see infra notes 14-49, 99-116 and accompanying
text.
11. For a further discussion of how the two leagues compare, see infra notes
14-116 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the NBA's disadvantage and possible solutions,
see infra notes 117-181 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion on how the NBA has changed, see infra 182-192
and accompanying text.
14. See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 691-99 (presenting important federal cases
involving professional sports teams, which impacts NBA directly or indirectly).
15. See NBA, Teams, http://www.nba.com/teams/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2009)
(providing NBA teams geographic locations). While these teams represent a ma-
jority of the National Basketball Players Association's ("NBPA") members, players
signed to the Toronto Raptors are protected under Canadian judicial and legisla-
tive authority on collective bargaining. See NAT'L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS'N, COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. XXIX, § 11 (July 25, 2005), available at http:/
/www.nbpa.com/cba-articles/ [hereinafter COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT]
(outlining exceptions for Canadian teams). Even so, the legal structures of the two
countries are so similar that no major differences currently exist. See id. (referenc-
ing Canadian labor laws).
16. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000) (outlining legal rights of unionization).
[Vol. 16: p. 343
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with their employer.17 Additionally, the NLRA prohibits an em-
ployer from unfairly interfering with the union's activities or prac-
tices.18 Therefore, an employer must permit its employees to
unionize and collectively negotiate with the union representatives
in good faith. 19
Moreover, once the employer officially recognizes an exclusive
representative from the union, federal law prohibits any employee
from independently engaging in any subsequent employment nego-
tiations. 20 The resulting agreement between the employer and
union representative signifies a contract, which legally binds the
two parties together under the expressed conditions of employ-
ment.2 1 Courts have broadly interpreted the term "party" in the
agreement to include subsequent employees, who were not privy to
the initial negotiations. 22 As a result, American workers can negoti-
ate preconditions necessary for entry into respective employment
positions, such as age limits, for all current and future employees.
23
In addition to these labor laws, employers engaged in inter-
state commerce in the United States cannot implement unfair com-
petitive practices. 24 The Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act")
prohibits an employer from acquiring a monopoly in its respective
17. See id. § 157 ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining .. ").
18. See id. § 158(a) (stating illegal labor practices). The Act states that unfair
labor practices include the use of coercive, discriminatory or forceful tactics. See
id.
19. See id. (providing employer's obligations).
20. See N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) (holding
"majority-rule concept" binds all employees to union decisions).
21. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597-99 (1960) (holding collective bargaining agreements have obligatory
force of contract).
22. See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 698-700 (citing Clarett v. Nat'l Football
League, 369 F.3d 124, 14041 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining how hiring criteria is per-
missible subject of collective bargaining).
23. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664 (1965)
(holding union and employer may decide terms of employment as long as they
constitute "mandatory subjects" of bargaining and do not violate federal labor
practices); see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 14041 (holding "mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining" included age limits). Similar protections for workers have been upheld in
Canada's highest court, which recently held that collective bargaining was a funda-
mental right inherent to all employees. See generally Health Services & Support-
Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, 2007
SCC 27 (Can.) (holding collective bargaining has important role in worker's
rights).
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industry through collusion with other industry owners or by
preventing the emergence of competition. 25 The United States
government has utilized the Sherman Act since its enactment to
break up large corporations that unfairly restrain free trade in their
respective industries. 26 Moreover, the Clayton Antitrust Act ("Clay-
ton Act") provides individuals with the legal right to file a com-
plaint in federal court against any employer engaged in
monopolistic practices for economic damages suffered from the re-
straint in trade. 27
The federal legislative and judicial branches recognized that
antitrust legislation conflicted with the legal right of unions to ne-
gotiate restrictive terms of employment and engage in bargaining
tactics, such as strikes and pickets, which adversely affect trade. 28
Therefore, the government formulated two exemptions to antitrust
scrutiny to allow unions to legal coexist with antitrust laws. 29 First,
the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act provide a statutory
exemption for certain labor union tactics undertaken during collec-
tive bargaining provided the union enacted them unilaterally.30
25. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000) (prohibiting collusion with other employers in
same industry or monopoly of trade). "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States .. .is declared to be illegal." Id. § 1 (2000).
26. See Brett Gibbs, Note, Antitrust and Sport League Franchise Relocation: Bring-
ing Raiders I Into the Modern Era of Anti Trust Law, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
217, 219-23 (noting principals behind enactment of Act and its use in breaking up
cartels); Abraham Spira, Almost Three Decades Later, Is Mackey Still Viable?, 17 FORD-
HAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 805, 810-11 (discussing how Sherman Act
targeted price fixing, group boycotts and territorial-based exclusions).
27. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000) (stating Clayton Act's provisions). The Clay-
ton Act in pertinent parts states:
[A] ny person who shall be injured.., by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue... in any district court of the United States...
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. § 15. Moreover, a party suing under the Act must "prove (1) a concerted
action between the defendant and a third party, (2) a restraint on trade, and (3)
an effect on foreign or interstate commerce." Shaffer, supra note 5, at 688. Courts
use two types of tests in determining whether the elements are satisfied: the rule of
reason approach and/or the per se approach. See id. at 688-89 (citing Standard Oil
Co. of NewJersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 55, 59-70) (presenting in more detail two tests
established by Supreme Court).
28. See Spira, supra note 26, at 811-13 (explaining congressional and judicial
role in exempting labor unions from anti-trust). For a further discussion of U.S.
labor laws, see supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text. Additionally, for a fur-
ther discussion of U.S. anti-trust laws, see supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
29. See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 689-91 (outlining exemptions to anti-trust).
30. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000) (presenting Clayton Act's codified
text). The Clayton Act, in pertinent part, states:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor ... organizations, instituted for the pur-
[Vol. 16: p. 343
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Second, the Supreme Court carved out a non-statutory exception
for employment negotiations between union representatives and
employers. 31 The Court held that non-statutory exceptions apply
when a union and a non-union labor party negotiate conditions
considered terms of employment under the NLRA.
3 2
In 1972, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the notion that profes-
sional sports teams qualify as employers that may be subjected to
antitrust scrutiny.3 3 The Court determined that professional sports
engage in interstate commerce, opening the door to possible anti-
trust suits. 3 4 Since then, various professional athletes, unsatisfied
with their restrictive employment conditions, have filed antitrust
claims against their respective leagues. 3  These players generally ar-
gued that their league, as the sole professional organization for that
poses of mutual help .... or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the antitrust laws.
Id. § 17 (2000). In addition, the LaGuardia Act limited the court's power and
influence over labor unions. See 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2000) (holding courts are with-
out jurisdiction to restrain unions from engaging in strikes or picketing).
31. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941) (formulating
non-statutory exception that labor and anti-trust laws must be read in harmony);
see also Connell Const. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616, 622 (1976) (restating non-statutory exception). Recently, the Su-
preme Court reasoned:
As a matter of logic, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to require
groups of employers and employees to bargain together, but at the same
time to forbid them to make among themselves or with each other any of
the competition-restricting agreements potentially necessary to make the
process work or its results mutually acceptable. Thus, the implicit exemp-
tion recognizes that, to give effect to federal labor laws and policies and
to allow meaningful collective bargaining to take place, some restraints
on competition imposed through the bargaining process must be
shielded from antitrust sanctions.
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996).
32. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (stating terms necessary to apply non-statutory
exception).
33. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-83 (1972) (holding professional bas-
ketball, among other professional sports, is not exempt from anti-trust laws). With
the exception of professional baseball, the Supreme Court has allowed anti-trust
claims against professional sports teams to advance in the legal system. See Yos-
kowitz, supra note 5, at 582-88 (detailing anti-trust application in professional
sports).
34. See Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 282-83 (holding professional sports engage in inter-
state commerce).
35. See Yoskowitz, supra note 5, at 592 (providing seminal suits against NBA
for anti-trust violations); see also Ryan Rodenberg, The NBA'S Latest Three Point Play,
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particular sport in the United States, unfairly restrained trade by
limiting a player's movement, income or entry requirements. 36
In Wood v. NBA, the Second Circuit analyzed the conflict of
labor and antitrust laws in the NBA's then current CBA.37 The
court determined that while the provisions in the CBA regulating
the salary cap would unreasonably restrain a player's potential earn-
ings, these rights could legally be eliminated through collective bar-
gaining and the non-statutory labor exception, thereby precluding
any antitrust scrutiny.38 The Second Circuit reaffirmed its position
in NBA v. Williams, concluding that a legally valid CBA circum-
vented any antitrust concerns.3 9
In determining whether a restrictive CBA rule embodies the
non-statutory exemption, the circuit courts have applied two tests. 40
The first, created by the Eighth Circuit in Mackay v. NFL, has three
factors that must be established for a legally valid claim.41 First, the
restrictive condition must only affect the bargaining parties. 42 Sec-
ond, the condition must concern a mandatory subject of the negoti-
ations. 43 Last, the condition must have been the product of a bona-
fide negotiation. 44
The second approach, employed by the Second Circuit in
Clarett v. NFL, rejects the Mackey approach and uses a more expan-
36. See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 699-700 (explaining potential anti-trust argu-
ments of players challenging CBA in NBA).
37. See 809 F.2d 954, 958-61 (2d Cir. 1987) (evaluating need to harmonize
labor and antitrust laws).
38. See id. at 962 (holding NBA's salary cap and draft did not violate antitrust
laws).
39. See 45 F.3d 684, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1995) (reaffirming holding in Wood).
40. See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 692-99 (describing two tests).
41. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 613-15 (8th Cir. 1976) (outlining three
principal factors needed for non-statutory exemption).
42. See id. at 614 ("First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may
potentially be given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on
trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship.").
43. See id. ("Second, federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail
only where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining.").
44. See id. ("Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to
the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agreement
sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining."). A
restrictive term included in the collective bargaining agreement, "is presumed to
have been the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining because it was negoti-
ated by both parties, however, when a provision is unilaterally implemented it is
likely that it was not the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining." Nicholas
E. Wurth, Comment, The Legality of an Age-Requirement in the National Basketball
League After the Second Circuit's Decision in Clarett v. NFL, 3 DEPAULJ. SPORTS L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 115-16 (2005) (defining bona fide negotiation).
[Vol. 16: p. 343
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sive test.45 In Clarett, the court upheld the NFL's minimum age re-
quirement as a legally valid term of employment.46 The court's
ruling emphasized the existence of strong federal labor laws pro-
tecting the right of unionization as a primary precursor to antitrust
suits. 47 As a result, the court determined that any condition that
could have been negotiated during collective bargaining is ex-
cluded from federal antitrust law.48 Therefore, unlike the Mackey
test, the Second Circuit held that the restrictive condition imposed
on the player did not have to actually have been negotiated; it only
needed to have been possible.
49
2. NBA's Organizational Structure
Using federal labor and employment law as a structural frame-
work, the modern NBA is composed of thirty privately owned teams
located in the United States and Canada.50 Team ownership ranges
from large conglomerations to single wealthy individuals.5 1 These
45. 369 F.3d 124, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing how Mackey court did not
properly define scope of non-statutory exemption); see alsoJack N.E. Pitts,Jr., Com-
ment, Why Wait?: An Antitrust Analysis of the National Football League and National
Basketball Association's Draft Eligibility Rules, 51 How. L.J. 433, 450-51 (describing
how Clarett court used broader test).
46. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143 (holding NFL age requirement did not violate
anti-trust laws). Neither side brought up the age requirement during the collective
bargaining agreement. See Spira, supra note 26, at 836-38 (discussing how NFL
imposed age limit after CBA was signed). The court held that while the players
union did not actively negotiate the term, "it was nonetheless a subject of arm's
length negotiation." Id. at 837.
47. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143 (emphasizing federal intent to maintain cur-
rent federal labor policy).
48. See id. at 142 (noting fact union did not actually negotiate eligibility terms
with owners was not dispositive that such term was not part of collective
bargaining).
49. See Pitts, supra note 45, at 450-51 (noting less demanding test used by Sec-
ond Circuit). "The holdings of other circuits fall to either side of this divide. The
Sixth and Ninth Circuits stand with the Eighth Circuit, while the Third and Sev-
enth Circuits join with the Second." Herb Smith II, Comment, Clarett v. NFL: More
a Warning Than a Victory, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. RaV. 745, 756 (2008) (listing circuit
split over proper application of non-statutory exemption).
50. See Rodenberg, supra note 35, at 14 (discussing NBA's structure). Cur-
rently, twenty-two states have at least one NBA team and only one team is located
outside the U.S., in the Canadian province of Ontario. See NBA, Teams, http://
www.nba.com/teams/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (listing websites of thirty NBA
teams).
51. See Comcast, Comcast-Spectacor, http://ww.comcast.com/corporate/
about/pressroom/comcastspectacor/comcastspectacor.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2009) (discussing how publicly traded media company owns majority share of Phil-
adelphia 76ers); The World's Billionaires, FORBES.COM, Mar. 8, 2008, http://www.
forbes.com/lists/2008/10/billionaires08-Mark-CubanIXMB.html (discussing
sole ownership interest of media billionaire Mark Cuban in professional basketball
team Dallas Mavericks). Currently only domestic American companies and private
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ownership entities independently manage their team's daily opera-
tions, but collectively use a central committee for league over-
sight.5 2 This central committee appoints a commissioner to market
the league, ensure uniform compliance with the rules and re-
present the management in negotiations with players. 53
Since 1964, the NBA has recognized the National Basketball
Players Association ("NBPA") as the exclusive representative of all
NBA athletes. 54 Operating as a union, members of the NBPA elect
players to an executive committee overseen by an executive direc-
tor.55 As the driving force behind players' rights in the NBA, the
NBPA strives to ensure that the NBA provides adequate health in-
surance, fair and equitable contracts and - when warranted - im-
poses reasonable penalties.5 6
individuals have a majority ownership interest of any NBA team. See Curtis Eichel-
berger, Foreign NBA Owner Predicted, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, http://seattle-
times.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2004268845_foreignnba08m.html?
syndication=rss (discussing potential for foreign individuals to purchase NBA
teams).
52. See NBA Board of Governors, HOOPEDIA.COM, http://hoopedia.nba.com/
index.php/NBA BoardofGovernors (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (describing
NBA's front office organizational structure).
53. See AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND
BUSINESS 149-58 (editor, Kluwer Law International 1997) (discussing powers con-
ferred onto NBA Commissioner by Board of Governors). The Commissioner's job
entails maintaining a positive public impression for the league by fining inappro-
priate conduct by players and owners. See id. (reviewing Commissioner's duties).
The Commissioner has fined the owner of the Dallas Mavericks over 1.5 million
dollars for his outrageous and offensive conduct during games. See Cuban Slammed
with $250,000 Fine, ABC NEwS.coM, June 20, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/
Sports/story?id=2098577&page=l (reporting on fines for insults Mark Cuban di-
rected at NBA referees).
54. See Rodenberg, supra note 35, at 14 (explaining history behind NBPA).
The NBPA formed in 1954 but instituted little reform for players' rights until theleague officially recognized the organization ten years later. See NAT'L BASKETBALL
PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, History, http://www.nbpa.com/history.php (last visited Mar.
8, 2009) [hereinafter NBPA History] (noting union made actual progress in
player's rights after first CBA).
55. See Andrew M. Jones, Hold the Mayo: An Analysis of the Validity of the NBA'sStern No Preps to Pros Rule and the Application of the Nonstatutory Exemption, 26 Lov.
L.A. Err. L. REv. 475, 480-86 (2005-2006) (describing role of executive director in
representing player's union); see also Hunter Seeks To Improve Image of Players, En-
hance Basketball, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. DALY, June 18, 2008, http://
www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/121709 (interview by Matthew Futterman
with Billy Hunter, Executive Director, NBPA) (commenting on Hunter's adver-
sarial role with NBA Commissioner in collective bargaining process).
56. See NAT'L BASKETBALL PLAYERs ASS'N, About the NBPA, http://www.nbpa.
com/aboutnbpa.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (presenting NBPA's mission state-
ment of protecting player interests). The union further protects the interest ofplayers outside of collective bargaining negotiations by holding sole licensing of
agent representation. See NBA Players Union Suspends Agent, ESPN.coM, http://
sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nba&id=3560252 (last visited Mar. 8, 2009)
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Approximately every six years since the mid-1960s, team own-
ers and the NBPA have negotiated terms of employment in a CBA,
binding all thirty teams and players to one uniform set of rules and
regulations.57 In addition to providing certain benefits to players,
owners utilize the CBA to limit a player's annual salary, restrict
trade options and provide minimum requirements for entry into
the NBA. 58 Since the mid-1980s, the owners have successfully advo-
cated the inclusion of a salary cap limiting the amount any team in
the NBA could spend on its collective salaries. 59 The NBA advo-
cates that such a limit on spending maintains a type of status quo in
the league by ensuring that the wealthier and more popular teams
cannot corner the market on all-star talent through overwhelming
enticements of large long-term deals. 60
The NBPA conversely argues that a salary cap severely restricts
a player's movement and potential salary, but agrees to such a re-
striction in turn for employment benefits and guaranteed salaries.
61
The inclusion of a minimum age requirement in the CBA is also a
hotly and long contested issue in the negotiations. 62 Previous CBAs
have imposed a minimum age in order to prevent students from
dropping out of high school to enter the draft.63 Nevertheless, the
(reporting on disciplinary action taking by union against O.J. Mayo's agent for
recruiting improprieties).
57. See NBPA History, supra note 54 (outlining dates player's union and NBA
signed collective bargaining agreements). Under U.S. labor law, the CBA binds all
players under one contract. See N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175,
180 (1967) (holding all employees are bound to collective bargaining terms and
conditions).
58. See Andreas Joklik, The Legal Status of Professional Athletes: Differences Between
the United States and the European Union Concerning Free Agency, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 233,
243 (2004) (explaining restrictions placed on NBA players by collective
bargaining).
59. See MARK CONRAD, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS: A PRIMER FOR JOURNALISTS
136 (Routledge 2006) (noting important milestones in NBA's collective bargaining
history). The NBA established the salary cap system before any other U.S. profes-
sional sport. See id. (commenting on NBA wage restrictions). The NBA's cap, how-
ever, is not an absolute maximum and in limited situations teams can exceed the
maximum salary ceiling to retain their own free agents. See Ira Winderman, Spin
Moves Aside, NBA Salaries Have to Change, NBCSPoRTS.COM, http://nbcsports.
msnbc.com/id/29499305/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (commenting on exceptions
teams can use to exceed NBA's salary cap).
60. See Conrad, supra note 59, at 136 (discussing impact of salary cap on
NBA's financial stability).
61. See Aschburner, supra note 5, at 685-86 (presenting argument that CBA
imposed raw deal on players).
62. See id. (remarking how use of age limit existed in prior CBA).
63. See Mark Heisler, New Age Limit in the NBA? Don't Count on It, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/08/sports/spw-heisler 8 (dis-
cussing current age limit and possibility of increases in 2011).
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2005 negotiations marked a dramatic shift, as Commissioner Stern,
a strong advocate for increasing the age threshold, believed that
players needed more years of development beyond the time that
they received in high school. 64 This issue has been open to tremen-
dous debate and was one of the last remaining sticking points that
held up the signing of the 2005 CBA.65 Most players in the NBA
oppose this rule and view it as a hollow condition that increases the
wealth of colleges at the expense of an athlete's potential
earnings. 6 6
3. 2005 CBA's Salary and Free Agent Clauses
The NBA's current CBA went into effect after the previous
CBA expired in the summer of 2005.67 It remains effective until the
end of the NBA's 2010-2011 season. 68 The current CBA imposes a
number of restrictions on a player's potential salary. 60 The severity
of this limitation depends on a number of factors, including how
long a player has been in the NBA and the amount of cap space a
team has available to sign the player.70
Players acquired through the first round of the draft are lim-
ited to a two-year contract with an option to extend it for two addi-
tional years. 7 1 Furthermore, these rookies are subjected to strict
64. See David Stern Media Conference, INSIDEHooPs.COM, Apr. 12, 2004
http://www.insidehoops.com/stern-interview-041104.shtml (recounting reasons
NBA pushed for age limit increase). For a further discussion of principles behind
the age limit, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
65. See Heisler, supra note 63 (commenting on how age limit was one of last
concessions). For a further discussion of benefits of age limit, see supra notes 4-5
and accompanying text.
66. See Heisler, supra note 63 (stating that over ninety percent of NBPA mem-
bers oppose age limit increase). "In 2005 we agreed to raise the age to 19 literally
at the 11th hour of bargaining in return for NBA concessions that increased the
salary cap." Id.
67. See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15 (present-
ing 2005 CBA agreement). For details regarding enactment of the current CBA,
see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
68. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. XXXIX (not-
ing time limit of CBA). The league, however, can exercise an option on December
15, 2010, to extend the agreement one more season. See id. (providing extension
option).
69. See NBA, NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement Ratified and Signed, July
30, 2005, http://www.nba.com/news/CBA 050730.html (highlighting key points
in agreement on salary for players and teams); see generally COLLEcrIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENt, supra note 15, art. VII (presenting detailed salary arrangement for
players).
70. See COLLECTiVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. II (establishing
limits on players' salaries).
71. See id., art. VIII (outlining contractual restrictions on first year players).
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floor and ceiling guidelines on their potential income.7 2 Players
who did not enter the NBA draft can still sign player contracts with
teams, but must still fulfill the draft age requirements in the year in
which their contract is signed. 73 Draft eligibility principally re-
quires that a player be at least nineteen years old and be one year
removed from graduating high school.
7 4
After a rookie's contract expires, the CBA continues to curtail
the annual salary and contract length that can be negotiated by the
player.75 The maximum salary that a player can receive is based on
a precise formula, factoring in the number of NBA seasons he has
played and his prior earnings. 76 Additionally, the length of these
contracts cannot exceed six years and the acquiring team must en-
72. See NAT'L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS'N, COLLECT"E BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
Exh. B Uuly 29, 2005), available at http://www.nbpa.org/cba exhibits/exhib-
itB.php (presenting salary charts for all rounds of NBA draft). The established
salary scale of a player selected with the first pick in the NBA draft is as follows:
3rd year 4th year option Qualifying offer
Season 1st year 2nd year option (% raise over (% raise over
Drafted salary salary salary 3rd year salary) 4th year salary)
2005-06 $3,617,100 $3,888,300 $4,159,600 26.1% 30.0%
2006-07 $3,751,000 $4,032,400 $4,313,700 26.1% 30.0%
2007-08 $3,885,000 $4,176,400 $4,467,700 26.1% 30.0%
2008-09 $4,019,000 $4,320,400 $4,621,800 26.1% 30.0%
2009-10 $4,152,900 $4,464,400 $4,775,900 26.1% 30.0%
2010-11 $4,286,900 $4,608,400 $4,929,900 26.1% 30.0%
2011-12 $4,420,900 $4,752,400 $5,084,000 26.1% 30.0%
Larry Coon, NBA Salary Cap, FAQ http://members.cox.net/lmcoon/salary-
cap.htm#88 (last visited Mar. 8, 2009). Teams signing a draft player must use
amounts on this chart in formulating player salaries. See id. The final salary ac-
cepted can be no less than eighty percent and no greater than one-hundred and
twenty percent of the year's scale salary figure. See id.
73. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. X (listing pre-
requisites for entry into NBA). For a further discussion of draft eligibility, see
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
74. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINNG AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. X (detailing
requirements for eligibility). The age requirement mandates that the player turn
at least nineteen sometime during the calendar year of the draft. See id. A U.S. or
foreign player, who does not graduate from high school, must wait one year from
the date he would have graduated to be considered eligible for the draft. See id.
75. See id., art. II (recounting precise formula utilized in calculating maxi-
mum salaries).
76. See Coon, supra note 72 (providing rookie contract limits). The maximum
salary of any active non-rookie NBA player based on CBA is as follows:
13
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sure that it has sufficient annual cap space available for the dura-
tion of the contract. 77
The CBA further interferes with a player's rights at the expira-
tion of his contract through the establishment of two classifications
of free agency: restricted and unrestricted.78 An unrestricted free
agent can sign with any team that has the available cap space to
tender an offer, but a restricted free agent must afford his team the





NBA salary 2005-06 2006-07 2008-09 2009-10
1 $9,000,000 or $12,000,000 $12,455,000 $13,041,250 $13,758,000
25% of cap
2 $9,000,000 or $12,000,000 $12,455,000 $13,041,250 $13,758,000
25% of cap
3 $9,000,000 or $12,000,000 $12,455,000 $13,041,250 $13,758,000
25% of cap
4 $9,000,000 or $12,000,000 $12,455,000 $13,041,250 $13,758,000
25% of cap
5 $9,000,000 or $12,000,000 $12,455,000 $13,041,250 $13,758,000
25% of cap
6 $9,000,000 or $12,000,000 $12,455,000 $13,041,250 $13,758,000
25% of cap
7 $11,000,000 or $14,400,000 $14,946,000 $15,649,500 $16,509,600
30% of cap
8 $11,000,000 or $14,400,000 $14,946,000 $15,649,500 $16,509,600
30% of cap
9 $11,000,000 or $14,400,000 $14,946,000 $15,649,500 $16,509,600
30% of cap
10 $14,000,000 or $16,800,000 $17,437,000 $18,257,750 $19,261,200
35% of cap
Id.
77. See COLLEcTIvE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15 (presenting Article
VII and IX on contract formation).
78. See COLLECTivE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. XI (providing
two classifications for free agents). For a player to be classified as a restricted free
agent, the following conditions must be met: (1) player must have been in the
league for fewer than three seasons or be in the fourth year of a rookie contract;
(2) player's team submitted a qualifying offer to the player; (3) "the qualifying
offer.., must be for 125% of the player's previous salary, or the player's minimum
salary... plus $175,000, whichever is greater;" (4) "The qualifying offer must be
for one season." Coon, supra note 72 (providing restricted agency details). All
other players are classified as unrestricted free agents. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. XI (defining unrestricted free agency).
79. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. XI (allowing
unrestricted free agents to negotiate with any NBA team); see also Coon, supra note
72 (commenting on precise qualifications for teams to impose restricted free
agency on players). If the restricted free agent receives an offer from another NBA
team, his original team can execute "its right of first refusal by matching the princi-
pal terms of the offer sheet, the player is then under contract to his original team."
Coon, supra note 72. The right of first refusal is discretionary and "if the player's
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The current CBA also contains provisions regulating a player's
marketing, ownership and licensing rights.80 Once a player has en-
tered into a contract with an NBA team, the league is permitted to
use his image for promotional activities, request post and pre-game
interviews on his behalf and require his attendance at events hosted
by sponsors, media and the general public.8' During these public
appearances, the CBA requires the player to act in a respectable
manner and represent the league as a positive role model.82 In ad-
dition to these employment responsibilities, a player is also regu-
lated in the type of activities he can engage in during his time off of
the court.83 The CBA binds the player to follow these conditions
and permits the Commissioner to impose substantial monetary
damages for violations of any enumerated clause. 84
B. Basketball Overseas
1. Europe's Business Model for Basketball
The Union of European Leagues of Basketball ("ULEB") is the
elite basketball association outside of North America.85 Currently,
the ULEB is comprised of sixteen premier national leagues span-
ning the continents of Asia and Europe. 86 Member leagues utilize
this organization to coordinate competitive exhibitions and estab-
lish working partnerships between their top affiliated private
teams.87 Twenty-four of these top private teams have been inte-
original team does not exercise its right . . .the offer sheet becomes an official
contract with the new team." Id.
80. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15 (posting CBA Arti-
cle VI and XXVIII on player restrictions).
81. See id. (expounding upon rights generally retained by NBA).
82. See id., art. VI (detailing cooperation required between league and
players).
83. See id., art. XXIII (proving player limitations in off-season). The CBA
forbids a player signed with any NBA team from participating in basketball related
activities not expressly condoned by the league. See id. In addition, another signif-
icant provision in the agreement prevents players from obtaining ownership inter-
est with any NBA team while they are employed. See id., art. XXIX (providing
limitation on league ownership by currently employed players).
84. See id., art. XIII (presenting penalties that league can impose).
85. See Ian Whittell, Europe's Top League Turns 50, ESPN.coM, May 2, 2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?page=whittelleuro080502 (recogniz-
ing ULEB as top European basketball organization).
86. See ULEB, ULEB History, http://www.uleb.net/htm/historyl.htm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2009) (listing membership of organization). Members include the
professional basketball leagues of Italy, Spain, France, Greece, Portugal, Belgium,
England, Switzerland, Germany, Holland, Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic,
Israel, Austria and the Adriatic League. See id.
87. See ULEB, What's ULEB, http://www.uleb.net/htm/whatl.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 8, 2009) (describing goals and purpose of association).
20091 357
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grated into a central conference, entitled Euroleague Basketball
("Euroleague") .88
Euroleague members derive from nine of ULEB's national
leagues and rank among the wealthiest professional basketball
clubs in Europe. 89 Team ownership consists of a hodgepodge of
financial backers, including extremely wealthy private individuals,
private companies and partnerships backed by thousands of com-
mon citizens, all of whom have strong national pride for their re-
spective countries. 90  These ownership entities independently
manage their team's daily operations, but collectively form the Gen-
eral Assembly for conference oversight. 91
88. See Europe's Top League Turns 50, supra note 85 (explaining league was pre-
viously titled European Cup); see also Press Release, Euroleague Basketball, AEG
Announce Global Partnership Agreement, (May 3, 2008) http://www.euroleague.
net/item/31718 (recounting league's formation).
89. See Greg Boeck, Inside the Five Best-Run Clubs, USA TODAY, http://www.usa
today.com/sports/basketball/europe/2006-04-19-top-teamsx.htm (last visited
Mar. 8, 2009) (listing top club budgets in 2006); see also Can Europe Afford the NBA's
Biggest Stars?, supra note 9 (noting dramatic increase in budgets for foreign leagues
in 2007-2008).
BALTIC ADRIATIC
Zalgiris Kaunas*: 7M Montepaschi Siena*: 17.16M
Lietuvos Rytas*: lIM Virtus Bologna*: 14M
Turof (Polish team): 5.46M Lyon Villeurbanne: 7.5M
Alba Berlin: 9.36M Cibona Zagreb*: 4.68M
Dynamo Kiev: lIM Olimpia*: 3.12M
SPAIN RUSSIA
Real Madrid*: 39M CSKA Moscow*: 50M
FC AXA Barcelona*: 34.32M Khimki: 18M
Tau Vitoria*: 31.2M Dynamo Moscow: 20M
Badalona: 12.48M Unix (Russian): 14M
Unicaja Malaga*: 28.08M Dynamo Moscow region: 14M
BALKANS ASIA
Panathinaikos Athens*: 42.12M Maccabi Tel Aviv*: 16M
Olympiacos Piraeus*: 35.88M Hapoel Jerusalem: 5M
Aris TT Bank*: 12.48M Efes Pilsen*: 12M
Partizan Belgrade*: 4.68M Fenerbahce Istanbul*: 1IM
Red Star Belgrade*: 3.12M Besictas Istanbul: 6M
Id. (providing "*" denotes Euroleague team, amounts in millions of U.S. dollars,
and totals are unofficial estimates).
90. See Ian Whittell, 10 Reasons to Watch the Euroleague, ESPN.coM, Nov. 12,
2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?page=whitteloneuroleague
(listing various ownership structures).
91. See Official Euroleague Basketball Homepage, Leagues, Clubs, Coaches Back
Euroleague Basketball's Restructuring Plan, Sept. 29, 2008, http://wwwv.euroleague.
net/euroleaguenews/off-court/main/i/35769/2354/item (reviewing role of Gen-
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol16/iss2/7
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING'S EFFECT ON NBA
An important responsibility of the General Assembly as a gov-
erning body entails appointing a chief executive officer to ensure
that all member teams comply with its mandates and by-laws. 92 The
chief executive officer also enforces a uniform set of regulations
and rules for game play, which are established by the International
Basketball Federation, more commonly known by its French acro-
nym, FIBA. 93 FIBA lacks any affiliation with ULEB or Euroleague
and implements uniform rules for all European and international
basketball associations. 94 Most notably, FIBA mandates a minimum
transfer age of eighteen years old between all national leagues and
provides guidelines for interacting with young players.
95
The General Assembly and its chief executive officer, however,
do not regulate individual player contracts or team salaries within
the conference. 96 As a result, players and teams negotiate unique
employment contracts specifically tailored to individual players.
97
eral Assembly). Each team and representative league has a vote in the assembly.
See id.
92. See Press Release, Euroleague CEO Jordi Bertomeu Press Conference
Transcript (July 10, 2008), http://www.euroleague.net/news/i/33800/180/item
(presenting responsibilities of CEO in administering league).
93. See generally FIBA: Internal Regulations 2008, (Apr. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.fiba.com/downloads/Regulations/Internal-Regulations-2008.pdf
(providing authority and rules over national leagues).
94. See id. at 17-55 (providing uniform rules for basketball organizations).
95. See id. at 71-72, 88 (forbidding players younger than eighteen years old
from transferring between national leagues). FIBA recognizes the NBA as the na-
tional league for the United States and therefore regulates player transfers be-
tween the NBA and other foreign leagues; see also Heather E. Morrow, The Wide
World of Sports is Getting Wider: A Look at Drafting Foreign Players into U.S. Professional
Sports, 26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 649, 690-700 (2004) (evaluating international player
transfers). The NBA has recognized its agreement with FIBA and encouraged for-
eign NBA players to participate in international competitions. See NBA Expects Play-
ers to Compete Internationally, NBCSPoRTS.COM, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/
18495522/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (reporting on NBA's recognition of agree-
ment with FIBA).
96. See Jon Saraceno, Show Me the Money: Playing Overseas Growing in Status,
USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/
2008-08-20-bball-overseas_.N.htm (commenting on how Europe lacks any salary cap
or limits on players' income).
97. See Pete Thamel, Greek Club is Eager to Sign N.B.A. Stars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2008, at SP4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/sports/basketball
/12owner.html (reporting that without player unions agreements are formed by
"handshakes"). Nevertheless, "there is a large percentage of contracts in Europe
that don't get honored .... Teams will give you reasons, claim injuries or tell you
the player didn't brush his teeth properly." Id. (quoting international sports agent
Mark Bartelstein). For a further discussion of the foreign team budgets, see supra
note 89 and accompanying text.
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The applicable labor laws imposed on the team represent the only
minimum limitations confronted when formulating a contract.98
2. European Union Labor Laws
A majority of the Euroleague's professional basketball teams
are located within the confines of the European Union ("EU"). 99
As a result, these teams are subject to both the applicable national
law of the member state in which they reside and the overreaching
community law established by the Treaty of European Community
("EC Treaty"). 100 Under the EC Treaty, member states are re-
quired to abide by and implement the imposed community laws. 10 1
These community laws are uniformly applied throughout the union
and retain primary supremacy over any established national law
that conflicts with the terms of the EC Treaty. 10 2
An important protection granted under the EC Treaty can be
found in Article 39, which secures movement rights for workers
within the EU community.103 Article 39 prohibits any EU employer
from discriminating against a worker's nationality or limiting a
worker's movement within the member nations. 10 4 The legislative
body of the EU enacted these protections to effectively eliminate
discrimination in the private workplace and ensure that workers
could find employment in any member nation. 10 5
98. See Ian Thomsen, Weekly Countdown, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, Feb. 22,
2008, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/ianthomsen/02/22/
weekly.countdown/1.html (presenting conflict between European laws and profes-
sional athletes). For a further discussion on the interaction of labor laws in Eu-
rope, see infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
99. See Europa Member States, http://europa.eu/abc/european-countries/
index _en.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (mapping European Union members);
Official Euroleague Homepage), Teams 2008-09 Season, http://www.euroleague.
netcompetition/teams (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (listing countries with teams in
league).
100. See Joklik, supra note 58, at 228 (noting interaction of domestic and
community law in Europe).
101. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997
OJ. (C340/181) [hereinafter EC Treaty] (describing how community laws must
interact with member nations).
102. SeeJoklik, supra note 58, at 228 (commenting on EU's legal structure).
103. EC Treaty, art. 39, 2002 OJ. (C325/193) (presenting rights of EU work-
ers). "Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community.
Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based
on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, re-
muneration and other conditions of work and employment." Id.
104. See id. (forbidding discriminatory practices).
105. SeeJoklik, supra note 58, at 246 (presenting objectives behind Article 39's
provisions).
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In Walrave & Koch v. Ass'n Union Cycliste International, the Euro-
pean Court ofJustice ("ECJ") interpreted Article 2 of the EC Treaty
such that EU community law applied to any private sports organiza-
tion engaged in "economic activity" within a member state. 10 6 The
ECJ defined "economic activity" as any employment relationship
that provides compensation for rendered services.10 7 Therefore,
the ECJ held that Article 39 of the EC Treaty prevented any profes-
sional team from imposing nationality requirements for participa-
tion in EU sporting events. 10 8
Approximately twenty years later, in Union Royale Belge des
Socidt6s de Football Association ASBL v. Bosman, the ECJ further de-
fined the limitations of Article 39 on professional player con-
tracts. 10 9 The issue in Bosman was whether a professional sports
team could demand a transfer fee from a former player after all
contractual obligations between the parties had expired. 110 The
ECJ ruled that a transfer fee levied after the expiration of all con-
tractual duties amounted to a discriminatory action, which violated
a player's right to free movement within the union."'
Nevertheless, the ECJ placed limitations on its Bosman ruling in
Lehtonen & Castors Can. Dry Namur-Braine v. Fed'n Royale Belge des
Societes de Baket-Ball ASBL.1 12 The issue in Lehtonen was whether a
professional basketball league could impose transfer deadlines lim-
106. See Case C-36/74, Walrave & Koch v. Ass'n Union Cycliste Int'l, 1974
E.C.R. 1405; see also EC Treaty, art. 2, OJ 1997 C340/181 (establishing legal author-
ity to promote equality in economic activities).
107. See Case C-36/74, Walrave & Koch v. Ass'n Union Cycliste Int'l, 1974
E.C.R. 1405 (defining economic activities).
108. See id. (holding that private sports teams were subject to Article 39).
109. See Case C-415/93, Union Royal Belge des Societes de Football Ass'n
ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 14921 (addressing restrictions on professional ath-
letes' contracts; see also Thomas M Schiera, Balancing Act: Will the European Commis-
sion Allow European Football to Reestablish the Competitive Balance that It Helped Destroy?,
32 BROOK. J. INTL'L L. 709, 714-16 (2007) (noting importance of Bosman decision
in reshaping how European football clubs operated). Before the Bosman ruling,
European clubs substantially relied on not having any type of free agency for their
players. See Schiera supra. Players were, in effect, owned for life by a single club,
which demanded large fees from any new team wishing to acquire contractual
rights to the specific player. See id. These payments provided a substantial income
for clubs, and the Bosman ruling ended this practice. See id.
110. See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Soci~t~s de Football Ass'n
ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 14921 (holding player's rights could not be retained
forever by single club).
111. See id. (applying Article 39 to transfer fees).
112. See Case C-1 76/96, Lehtonen & Casors Can. Dry Namur-Braine v. Fed'n
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iting a player's employment options within that league." 3 The ECJ
ruled that Bosman did not mandate an absolute prohibition on con-
tractual clauses that operate to limit a player's post-employment op-
portunities.' 14 Rather, the ECJ held that while transfer deadlines
restricted the free movement of a player, these deadlines could le-
gally be imposed if the sporting association's governing body pro-
vided a legitimate reason for implementing the deadline. 115
Further, the ECJ found that encouragement of a competitive atmos-
phere amounted to a valid public purpose and provided a legal ex-
ception to Article 39.116
III. ANALYsis: Two COMPETING BASKETBALL LEAGUES
A. Europe's Competitive Advantage
In the summer of 2008, foreign teams in Euroleague noticed
that a weak American economy and restrictive salary cap had placed
NBA team rosters in a vulnerable position. 1 7 To capitalize on this
perceived weakness, foreign teams began competing for NBA free
agents by matching or exceeding comparable offers. 1 8 An Italian
national club, Pallacanestro Virtus Roma ("Roma"), signed the elite
American point guard Brandon Jennings to a multi-million dollar
contract. 119 Jennings, an eighteen year old high school standout,
effectively by-passed the NBA age limit and jump-started his profes-
113. See id. (commenting on how Belgian team faced league penalties for ac-
quiring player after trade deadline).
114. See id. (holding limited application of Bosman).
115. See id. (requiring legitimate justification for obstacles to player
movement).
116. See id. (holding that any player restrictions must be uniformly applied
and not distinguish between established country zones).
117. See Jonathan Givony, Tables Turning on NBA's Relationship with Europe,
DraftExpress.coM, Aug. 1, 2005, http://www.draftexpress.com/article/Tables-
turning-on-NBA-s-relationship-with-Europe-1064/ (noting incentives players get to
remain in Europe); see also Saraceno, supra note 96 (presenting how economic
tables have turned in favor of Europe).
118. See Marc Stein, Cats' Boykins Latest NBA Player to Bolt for Europe, Signs $3.5
Million Deal, ESPN.coM, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3520898
(last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (listing all NBA free agents who signed with Euroleague
teams). For a further discussion of players that signed abroad, see supra note 9
and accompanying text.
119. See Evan Weiner, Europe Provides Players With Lucrative Second Option, N.Y.
SUN, Aug. 21, 2008, available at http://www.nysun.com/sports/europe-provides-
players-with-lucrative-second/84308/ (providing deal specifics). Jennings signed a
three-year contract with Roma and will earn 1.2 million (dollars) for the 2008-2009
season. See Thamel, supra note 97 (discussing salary and shoe endorsements ac-
quired by Jennings).
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sional career.120 Another team, Greek club Olympiacos, acquired
restricted free agent Josh Childress with the largest contract in
Euroleague history. 12 1 By the conclusion of the 2008 free agency
period, the NBA had witnessed a mass outflow of NBA free agents
headed across the Atlantic for new homes in the Euroleague and
braced for a dramatic shift in the world of sports.
122
Several important factors have allowed Euroleague teams to
entice players with more money and thus gain a competitive edge
in the free agent market. 123 First, contract formation in Europe
favors the player because an affiliated FIBA or Euroleague organiza-
tion negotiates salaries using a "net total after taxes" approach.
124
Under this approach, the team pays the taxes necessary to reach the
agreed upon salary.1 25 Teams do not have to be concerned with
league imposed salary limits when determining the final contract
amount and are free to determine a player's appropriate value on
the open market.126 Additionally, to further entice a player to sign
with a particular team, owners frequently offer players special bene-
fits. 127 European teams have tendered free gas, new cars, resi-
120. See Weiner, supra note 119 (commenting on how Jennings had to wait
one year before becoming eligible for NBA draft and this impacted his decision to
play abroad). For a further discussion of the NBA draft requirements, see supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
121. See Thamel, supra note 97 (reporting Childress, received three-year, $20
million contract from Olympiacos, making his, "the biggest contract in basketball
outside the United States."). With a majority of expenses paid by the team "Chil-
dress estimated he would take home about $6 million this season, about twice as
much as he would have had he played in the N.B.A." Id.
122. SeeWeiner, supra note 119 (recognizing shift in global basketball). "The
NBA may still be the best basketball league on the planet, but it is not the only
league willing to pay big salaries, and players and their agents know it." Id.
123. See Ian Whittell, The Lure of Europe: Fact and Fiction, ESPN.coM, Aug. 1,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?page=euroamfactfiction [here-
inafter The Lure of Europe: Fact and Fiction] (discussing key advantages Europe has
because lack of salary cap and large player incentives).
124. See Weiner, supra note 119 (explaining how players and teams negotiate
salaries). Euroleague teams utilize such an approach to player contracts because
almost every team in the league comes from a different European country. See id.
For a discussion of Euroleague member locations, see supra note 100 and accom-
panying text. Each of these countries has its own unique tax code, and as a result,
it becomes difficult for professional athletes to determine their potential salary
when evaluating offers coming from all over the EU without a uniform approach.
See Can Europe Afford the NBA's Biggest Stars?, supra note 9 (detailing tax structure in
Europe).
125. See Weiner, supra note 119 (describing how final salary is reached by in-
cluding potential taxes).
126. See Saraceno, supra note 96 (noting lack of salary restrictions in Europe).
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dences and rent.128 Players also have the option of becoming
partial owners of their team and can sell advertising space on their
uniforms.129
Conversely, in the NBA, such benefits are prohibited under the
CBA. 130 Moreover, the CBA limits the amount a team can offer a
free agent depending on the player's prior salary, years employed
in the league and amount of cap space the team has available. 13' In
addition, a player's final contract salary must be included in his
gross income and taxed at the both the state and federal level.' 3 2
Due to these factors, the annual salary that an NBA player agrees
upon is actually realized as a far reduced amount. 133
The Euroleague was further able to lure players away from the
NBA because of the strong value of the Euro over the U.S. dollar. 134
In the summer of 2008, the U.S. economy experienced large out-
flows of capital as the domestic financial market experienced a
massive credit crunch and a severe weakening in consumer confi-
dence. 35 European markets were also depressed by the financial
crisis, however, the Euro continued to exchange at a significantly
128. See id. (reporting on incentives offered to players). "Their expenses are
limited to food, incidentals and gasoline. If a guy is smart, it's a very good living in
Europe." Id. (quoting agent who represents players abroad).
129. See Can Europe Afford the NBA's Biggest Stars?, supra note 9 (commenting
on advertising and ownership rights of players).
130. See COLLECrIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. II (prohibit-
ing providing NBA players with perks). For a further discussion of marketing and
ownership limitations imposed on players under the CBA, see supra notes 71-77
and accompanying text.
131. See Christian Dennie, From Clarett to Mayo: The Antitrust Labor Exemption
Argument Continues, 8 TEx. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 63, 77 (2007), (reviewing restric-
tions placed on NBA players' salaries). For a further discussion on the salary re-
strictions on an NBA player, see supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion on legal challenges in NBA, see supra notes 29-42 and accompa-
nying text. Courts analyzing such limitations on players have ruled that while the
restrictive terms unfairly restrain trade, the players legally negotiated away such
rights during the collective bargaining process. See generally Wood v. NBA, 809
F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding limitations on players' salaries can be considered
legally binding under CBA and enforceable).
132. SeeJohn DiMascio, Note, "The Jock Tax": Fair or Unsportsmanlike Conduct,
68 U. PIrr. L. REv. 953, 957-58 (2007) (discussing large taxes NBA athletes must
pay to state and federal governments).
133. See id. at 972 (commenting on large reduction in salaries after tax).
134. See Kenneth Musante, Dollar Hits 5-Month High, CNN.com, http://money
.cnn.com/2008/08/08/markets/dollar/index.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (re-
porting on wide gap between Euro and dollar value despite dollar hitting five
month high)..
135. See Erikka Askel, Investors Looking to Far East as UK and US Face Consumer
Meltdown, Aug. 20, 2008, http://business.scotsman.com/business/Investors-look
ing-to-Far-East.4406349.jp (analyzing deterioration of U.S. economy).
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higher value than the U.S. dollar. 13 6 As a result of these economic
conditions, Euroleague teams were easily able to extend contracts
to mid-range free agents that matched or exceeded comparable of-
fers from the NBA.
1 3 7
In addition to the large sums of money enticing players, many
commentators noticed that the free agents making the jump to Eu-
rope were predominantly foreigners returning to their home coun-
ties. 3" Over the years, the NBA has attracted a diverse range of
players from all over the world. 139 During the 2008 playoffs, almost
every participating team had an international player on their ros-
ter. 140 Further, as of 2006, almost twenty percent of all players in
the NBA came to the league from an foreign country. 141 Commen-
tators speculated that such a move signaled that these players, in
addition to desiring more money, wanted the more active roles
available on European rosters and viewed the move without per-
ceived drawbacks. 1
42
B. How Competition Affects the NBA
1. The Immediate Impact on Free Agency
The rise in European competition signals a dramatic reversal
of the NBA's dominant hold on global basketball talent.' 43 The sal-
ary cap and restrictive wage conditions imposed on NBA players
have worked against the primary objectives that owners believed
that they would achieve; chiefly, increased growth and competition
136. See Musante, supra note 134 (discussing disparity between dollar and
Euro). One Euro had the purchasing power of approximately one and a half dol-
lars. See id.
137. See Can Europe Afford the NBA's Biggest Stars?, supra note 9 (commenting
on 2008 free agent signings).
138. See The Lure of Europe: Fact and Fiction, supra note 123 (reporting on play-
ers returning to their country of origin).
139. See Lee, supra note 8 (describing NBA's global power).
140. See NBA, NBA Players From Around The World: 2007-08 Season, Aug. 7,
2008, http://www.nba.com/players/int-players-0708.html (listing international
players on NBA rosters).
141. See Mike Fine, International Influx in NBA, METRO WEST DAILY NEWS, Feb.
1, 2008, http://www.metrowestdailynews.com/sports/x 59 8 9 4 1308?view=print (re-
porting number of international players in NBA has hovered from around eighty-
five to seventy-six).
142. See See The Lure of Europe: Fact and Fiction, supra note 123 (commenting on
reasons behind free agency trends toward Europe).
143. SeeJordan Kobritz, Bidding War in the NBA, DAILY COURIER.COM, Aug. 29,
2008, http://prescottdailycourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=2&subsectionlD= 2 &
articlelD=58679 (discussing how NBA players signing abroad symoblizes reversal of
past precedent). For further information on how players can earn more money
abroad, see supra notes 123-129 and accompanying text.
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within the NBA.144 With the emergence of European teams actively
acquiring NBA players, NBA owners witnessed a third party aggres-
sively shaking up the traditional field of free agency. 145
Before European competition, a free agent would receive of-
fers from only a select few NBA teams that had enough cap space to
compete for the player's services. 146 This practice was advanta-
geous for current owners because in order to retain a restricted free
agent owners only had to compete against the few teams that had
adequate cap space to make an offer that they could not match. 147
With the emergence of more assertive and competitive offers from
Europe, free agents now have a viable bidder competing for their
services. 148 This relationship creates a stronger bargaining position
for the player to negotiate for a higher salary, which also helps to
determine the actual market value of a player.1 49
Furthermore, the upsurge in foreign competition expands a
restricted free agent's freedom of movement.1 50 Under the current
CBA, teams are given the opportunity to match any offer that a re-
144. See Mike Cranston, Should NBA Fear a Mass Exodus of Talent to Europe?,
USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/2008-08-
06-1497920822_x.htm (reporting how restrictive salary limits imposed by CBA have
created European option for players). For further information on owners' goals
for CBA, see supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
145. See The Lure of Europe: Fact and Fiction, supra note 123 (commenting on
traditional free agency). For further information on dramatic events unfolding
during 2008 free agency, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
146. See Jonathan B. Goldberg, Player Mobility in Professional Sports: From the
Reserve System to Free Agency, 15 SPORTS LAw. J. 21, 48-50 (2008) (discussing how
NBA's free agency works); see also COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note
15, art. XI (providing contract guidelines for restricted free agents and free
agents). For a further discussion of the limitations imposed on restricted free
agents, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
147. See The Lure of Europe: Fact and Fiction, supra note 123 (describing how
some restricted free agents did not receive any offers). "This summer has exposed
the fact that restricted free agency is barely free agency ... Josh Smith does not
get a single offer sheet; Andre Iguodala gets no offers. Nobody offers them a con-
tract because they know it is going to be matched." Id. (quoting international
sports agent Guy Zucker).
148. See Kyle Hightower, Euroleague's Deals Entice NBA Players, ORLANDO SENTI-
NEL, Oct. 10, 2008, at D3, available at 2008 WLNR 19320512 (reporting on lucrative
deals offered by Euroleague teams).
149. See Geoffrey C. Arnold, Pick and Roll: Overseas Basketball Gives NBA Free
Agents Another Option, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 3, 2008, at 4, available at
2008 WLNR 14450471 (describing how NBA players economically benefit from
having competing leagues); see also The Lure of Europe: Fact and Fiction, supra note
123 (detailing impact on players' salaries).
150. See Arnold, supra note 149 ("Childress doesn't see himself as a pioneer,
but his decision has altered the restricted-free-agent process.").
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stricted free agent receives. 151 The precise language of the option,
however, only applies to offers from NBA teams and not foreign
clubs. 152 As a result, NBA teams with restricted free agents who en-
tertain international offers are not afforded the opportunity to
match the competing proposal and retain the player on their
roster.
1 53
Moreover, after the player decides to sign abroad, the former
NBA team must tender an offer to the player each year that he re-
mains a restricted free agent in order to retain the "right of first
refusal" should he ever return to the NBA.154 If the player opts not
to return, tendered offers further limit the team's free agency re-
cruitment for the year because the proposal directly applies against
the team's annual salary cap. 1
55
2. The Immediate Impact on Young Players
Brandon Jennings' signing with Roma marks a dramatic set-
back for the objectives of the NBA's age requirement.156 Commis-
sioner Stern had hoped that a year in college basketball would
151. See COLLECrIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. XI (providing
teams with "right of first refusal"); see also Goldberg, supra note 146, at 49 (discuss-
ing restricted free agency). If a restricted free agent fails to receive offer sheets
from other NBA teams, the player is forced to accept the qualifying offer submit-
ted by his original team if he wishes to play in the league that year. See COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. XI (providing player options). Teams
often used this practice to their advantage to keep restricted free agents on their
team at low qualified offers by scaring away competition through statements that
they would match any offer. See Arnold, supra note 149 (describing how teams
used "right of first refusal" to keep players on their teams at low contracts). For a
further discussion of restricted free agents who experienced such a practice, see
supra note 147 and accompanying text.
152. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. XI (lacking
any language referencing foreign leagues).
153. See Luciana Chavez, NBA Players Eyeing Job Offers in Europe, NEWS & OB-
SERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 14, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 15194094 (report-
ing how Euroleague offers fall outside of CBA).
154. See CoLLECTrE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. XI (providing
how teams can renounce player's restricted free agent status). Once a player's
team has renounced their "right of first refusal" the player becomes a free agent
who can negotiate with any team. See id. (stating impact of renunciation).
155. See id. (reporting how teams can retain restricted free agent status on
players); see also Chavez, supra note 153 ("In Childress's case, Atlanta retains his
NBA rights for two more seasons if they make a qualifying offer. If they don't give
up those rights, the offer goes against their salary cap. If they do give them up,
Childress becomes a free agent.").
156. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 15, art. X (discussing
CBA's age restriction); see also Heisler, supra note 63 (informing age requirement
purpose was to prevent players coming directly from high school). For a further
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allow players to hone their basketballs skills and personally mature
and provide NBA scouts with the opportunity to objectively evaluate
their potential draft stock.157 Jennings, however, did not share the
same philosophy and saw no need to have academics coupled with
basketball. 158 By circumventing the age requirement, Jennings
turned the restriction against the NBA and blazed the path for top
American high school graduates ready for the professional arena to
immediately start earning a substantial salary. 159
3. The NBA's Possible Response
While a majority of the signings from Euroleague teams in-
volved only mid-range free agents, the recent European acquisi-
tions have attracted the attention of the NBA's biggest stars. 160 Two
of the league's preeminent players, LeBron James and Kobe Bryant,
announced at the 2008 Beijing Olympics their willingness to sign
abroad when their respective contracts expire.1 61
In response to these players' high profile announcements and
the significant number of summer signings, NBA representatives
and owners have consistently repudiated the notion that the NBA's
global dominance is declining.1 62 Nevertheless, the NBA is formu-
157. See Stern, supra note 64 (noting Commissioner Stern's objectives).
158. See Scott Howard-Cooper, Hot basketball prospect testing waters overseas: Jen-
nings Sets Precedent By Sidestepping NCAA, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 14, 2008, at Cl,
available at 2008 WLNR 17481986 (discussing prospects forJennings in Europe);
William C. Rhoden, Old World Lesson for the New N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2008,
at D3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/sports/basketball/23
rhoden.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/B/Basketball (com-
menting on how Jennings saw prospect of heading to college in negative light).
159. See id. (reporting howJennings move means college teams must compete
for talent and NBA teams have to buy outJennings contract if he returns to NBA
after one year).
160. See Marc J. Spears, Europe Can Reach for Stars, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10,
2008, http://www.boston.com/sports/basketball/articles/2008/08/1 O/europe_
canreach for -stars/ (reviewing top players reactions to free agent signings with
Euroleague teams).
161. See Lawrence Donegan, Olympics: US Stars Admit They Could Leave NBA for
Europe, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Aug. 8, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2008/
aug/08/olympicsbasketball.olympics2008 (announcing possibility that top players
would leave NBA for annual salary of fifty million dollars). But seeJimmy Smith, No
Big Deak European Teams Created Waves with Lucrative Offers This Summer, But the NBA
Shouldn't Fear an Exodus of Elite Players, TIMES-PICAVUNK (New Orleans), Oct. 12,
2008, at A14, available at 2008 WLNR 19441613 ("Bryan dismissed commments
attributed to him over the summer about potentilly playing in Europe as 'ajoke.'. . . James didn't outright dismiss the idea, saying it was a 'possibility' in
Beijing.").
162. See Kobritz, supra note 143 (evaluating why NBA owners are not con-
cerned by move of players); see also Chavez, supra note 153 (quoting Joel Litvin,
NBA's president of league and basketball operations as saying, "[w] e're not terribly
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lating possible options to counter the exodus of top NBA stars from
following the free agency trend abroad.
163
One possible option is for the NBA to directly negotiate a re-
stricted free agent transfer agreement with Euroleague. 164 Under
such an agreement, an NBA team could loan or sell the rights of a
restricted free agent. 165 The interested European team would be
required to compensate the player's NBA team with an established
fee in order to enter into negotiations for the player's services.
1 6 6
The arrangement would be advantageous to the NBA because the
fee would produce a revenue flow that could be used to pay any
luxury tax overages. 167 Nevertheless, such an arrangement would
undoubtedly be challenged in the United States under antitrust
laws and in Europe under Article 39.168
In the United States, the NBA would have difficulty establish-
ing that the restriction fulfilled the non-statutory exemption to anti-
trust scrutiny.' 69 If a court reviewing the proposed transfer
agreement applied the Mackey test, the transfer condition would fall
outside the third requirement of a "bonafide negotiation. '170 Addi-
tionally, under the Clarett approach, the NBA would face an uphill
concerned .... In fact, we see this as a positive indication of how popular the
sport of basketball is on a global basis.").
163. See Mike Kahn, Europe Looking Very Attractive for NBA Free Agents, Fox-
SPoRTs.coM, http://msn.foxsports.com/nba/story/8370370/Europe-looking-very-
attractive-for-NBA-free-agents (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (detailing how moves
abroad highlight NBA's financial weakness and noting that unless something is
done "this summer will continue to have surprises, only to be outdone by next
summer and the summer that follows that").
164. See Does World Basketball Need a Soccer-Style Transfer System? BLEACHER
REPORT.cOM, July 23, 2008, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/40340-does-world-
basketball-need-a-soccer-style-transfer-system (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (arguing
transfer agreement would compensate teams that are powerless in preventing free
agents from signing abroad).
165. See id. (describing how agreement would work).
166. See id. (stating fee would work well for NBA's mid-level talent).
167. See id. ("The cash earned from a transfer could help small-market teams
pay the luxury tax and remain competitive, while the salary cap would prevent the
Los Angeles Lakers and the Chicago Bulls from buying up huge contracts and
dominating the league.").
168. See Schiera, supra note 109, at 714-16 (discussing impact of Article 39 in
upholding transfer rights of professional athletes); see also Shaffer, supra note 5, at
699-700 (explaining potential anti-trust arguments of players challenging restric-
tions in NBA).
169. Compare U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941) (formulating non-
statutory exception that labor and anti-trust laws must be read in harmony), with
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (holding non-statutory excep-
tions apply when union and non-union labor party negotiate conditions consid-
ered to be terms of employment under NLRA).
170. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614-15 (8th Cir. 1976) (outlining three
principal factors); see also Wurth, supra note 44, at 115-16 ("[W]hen a provision is
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battle persuading the court that the condition was a mandatory sub-
ject of employment that could have arisen during bargaining
negotiations. 7 1
The hypothetical transfer agreement would also face chal-
lenges in Europe on grounds that it constrained the free movement
of workers as prohibited by Article 39.172 Applying the ruling in
Bosman, the agreement would likely constitute the type of transfer
fee that the ECJ held were illegal. 173 The NBA could counter Bos-
man, however, by formulating a reason for why the restriction pro-
motes a competitive atmosphere within the NBA and
Euroleague. 174 The final acceptance of such complicated argu-
ments would prove difficult and the NBA would have the full weight
of legal precedent stacked against its potential theories. 175
A more plausible solution for the NBA is to move forward
quickly with expansion plans in Europe. 176 Under the guidance of
Commissioner Stern, the NBA has become a global media power-
house. 177 Currently, the NBA can be seen in over two hundred
countries and is accessible on every major continent. 78 The NBA
has always made global expansion a primary goal, using Michael
Jordan and the "Dream Team" to bring the NBA's culture and star-
dom to Europe. 179
unilaterally implemented it is likely that it was not the product of bona fide arm's-
length bargaining.").
171. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Pitts, supra
note 45, at 450-51 (noting less demanding test used by Second Circuit still has
threshold and ruling does not stand for unlimited power).
172. See EC Treaty art. 39, July 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C325/193) (granting EU
workers freedom of movement).
173. See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Socift&s de Football Associa-
tion ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921 (holding transfer fee levied after expira-
tion of all contractual duties violated player's free movement within union).
174. See Case C-176-96, Lehtonen & Castors Can. Dry Namur-Braine v. Fed'n
Royale Belge des Societes de Baket-Ball ASBL, 2000 E.C.R. 1681, 3 C.M.L.R. 409
(2000) (holding encouragement of competitive atmosphere amounted to valid
public purpose providing legal exception to Article 39).
175. SeeJoklik, supra note 58, at 225-33, 24345 (comparing legal status of pro-
fessional athletes in US and EU concerning free agency).
176. See Euchner, supra note 6 ("Expansion offers the best way to head off a
rival league."); see also Kahn, supra note 163 (arguing expansion into Europe will
halt trend of players signing abroad).
177. See Euchner, supra note 6 (discussing evolution of NBA into global sport
under David Stem).
178. See id. ("More than 900 NBA games and 45,000 hours of NBA program-
ming are seen in 215 countries in 41 languages with 188 TV partners .... ESPN
International brings NBA content to more than 25 million households in 97 coun-
tries and territories outside the United States.").
179. See NBA, NBA's Greatest Moments, http://www.nba.com/history/dream
T_moments.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (discussing how U.S. 1992 Olympic
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The possibility of a European NBA team has increased in re-
cent years as foreign cities have constructed larger stadiums and the
numbers of NBA fans have grown. 180 An expansion team in Europe
would place pressure directly on Euroleague teams to maintain a
competitive edge in their own country and would place the top con-
tracts of European teams in the NBA's cross hairs.18 1
TV. CONCLUSION
The NBA's 2008 free agency period exposed the weakness cre-
ated by the restrictive conditions in the league's CBA. 182 Players
now have options on a truly international scale. 18 3 Whether Jen-
nings' move will be the start of America's young talent leaving or
whether it will remain an isolated incident has yet to be deter-
mined.184 Nevertheless, his lucrative contract with Roma, coupled
with a recent endorsement by the global athletic company Under
basketball team won gold in dominating fashion and acquired international ac-
claim for wide point spreads). The 1992 U.S. Olympic team was the first to feature
international stars and formally introduced the sport to Europe. See HARvEY
ARATON, CRASHING THE BORDERS: How BASKETBALL WON THE WORLD AND LOST ITS
SOUL AT HOME 43-57 (Free Press 2005) (commenting on how Dream Team intro-
duced sport to Europe and instilled desire in Europeans to play professional bas-
ketball); see also Michael Wallace, Miami Heat, NBA at Home Abroad: The Potential
Expansion of the NBA to Europe has Gone from Pipe Dream to Possibility, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 14, 2008, http://www.miamiherald.com/sports/story/-725032.html ("NBA
commissioner David Stern has had visions of a five-team expansion into Europe
within the next 10 years, a growth spurt that would increase the number of teams
from 30 to 35.").
180. See Broderick Turner, NBA to Operate Arenas in China: The League, in a
Joint Venture with AEG, says Facilities will Showcase Basketball, Other Sports Events, Con-
certs and Trade Shows, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at 7, available at 2008 WLNR
19435765 (discussing how new stadiums in Europe and Asia will enable NBA ex-
pansion teams).
181. See Kahn, supra note 163 (discussing need for NBA to draw away reve-
nues from Euroleague to continue dominance).
182. See The Lure of Europe: Fact and Fiction, supra note 123 (discussing disad-
vantage NBA teams are placed in relative to Euroleague teams in signing free
agents because of restrictions in CBA).
183. See Mike Vaccaro, Free Agency Is Now Global War, N.Y. POST, Aug. 24, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 16177288 (quoting Kobe Bryant) ("When players become
free agents, the team they're currently with, their competition is no longer the rest
of the teams in the NBA. It's global. The market's opened up.").
184. See Thamel, supra note 97 (commenting whether other high school grad-
uates will follow Jennings remains an open ended question). But See Ray Glier,
BrandonJennings Sends Home a Warning From Europe, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 23, 2009, at D3,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2 0 0 9 /0 1/24/sports/basketball/24recruit.
html?_r=l (reporting on warning issued byJennings while playing in Europe).Jen-
nings released the statement to inform other high school recruits thinking of fol-
lowing his move abroad that "visions of instant riches, fame and success in Spain,
France, Italy, Greece or some other destination," may not be an instant reality. Id.
"I've gotten paid on time once this year," Jennings said in an e-mail mes-
sage. "They treat me like I'm a little kid. They don't see me as a man. If
20091
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Armour, shows critics that a young American player can earn over
six figures abroad while waiting for the NBA draft. 185 If more top
high school players follow this trend, the age restriction is unlikely
to survive the next round of negotiations. 186 At the expiration of
the current CBA, the NBPA will also have a bargaining advantage
putting them in a stronger position to argue for maximum wage
increases and more flexibility in teams' maximum salary cap. 187
Perhaps seeing Kobe in a Roma or Olympiacos jersey may not
be as distant of a future as NBA executives would like to believe. 8
As Euroleague teams continue to acquire mid-range NBA players,
the level of play in Europe is bound to increase significantly. 189 Un-
less the NBA begins to implement expansion plans in Europe some-
time soon, the delay may prove costly. 190 Euroleague teams will
likely target more talented NBA free agents as the budgetary gap
between the Euroleague's top teams and their American counter-
parts narrows. 91 As one commentator simply stated, "[w]ith every-
you get on a good team, you might not play a lot. Some nights you'll play
a lot; some nights you won't play at all. That's just how it is."
Id.
185. See Ryan Sharrow, Brandon Jennings to Become Face of Under Armour Basket-
ball Line, BALTIMORE Bus. J., Sept. 24, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 18150288 (re-
porting Jennings signed multi-million dollar agreement with Under Armour
instead of signing with Nike or Adidas).
186. See Hunter SaysJennings'Europe Venture Could End NBA Age Limit, STREET &
SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. DAILY, July 10, 2008, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
article/122236 (discussing how NBPA executive director views Jennings' move as
beginning of end of NBA's "one and done rule"). For a further discussion ofJen-
nings's contract, see supra note 119 and accompanying text.
187. See Arnold, supra note 149 (commenting on how bargaining position for
players has shifted in players' favor).
188. See Vaccaro, supra note 183 (arguing Kobe or another superstar will even-
tually be signed in Europe); see also Olympiacos Owner Willing to Pursue More NBA Free
Agents, ESPN.coM, Oct. 15, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=
3644739 (quoting billionaire owner Panayiotis Angelopoulos of Olympiaco) ("I
think we'll see a day when a superstar player comes to Europe ..... Maybe it will
be very soon. Maybe then you realize what I'm telling you is serious."). But see
Smith, supra note 161 (arguing Kobe is not interested in more money and would
rather win NBA championships instead).
189. See Arnold, supra note 149 (commenting on how former NBA players will
increase level of play in Euroleague games).
190. See Kahn, supra note 163 (arguing NBA must expand abroad to sustain its
dominance).
191. See NBA salaries for 2007-08, DAu.Ls MORNING NEws, http://www.dallas
news.com/sharedcontent/dws/spt/basketball/nba/nbasalaries.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2009); Thamel, supra note 97 (noting six Euroleague teams may have oper-
ating budget to sign NBA superstar Kobe Bryant). For a further discussion of the
Euroleague's unofficial budget, see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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body being able to pay, the basketball world seems to be - as author
Thomas Friedman would say - getting flat." 19
2
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